《亚洲时代》：中情局和西藏大赛（职业记者写的阴谋论）

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免费职业记者写的阴谋论

原文提供者是亚洲在线

Tibet, the 'great game' and the CIA

中情局和xizang大赛

作者 理查M本尼特（Richard M Bennett）

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JC26Ad02.html

Tibet, the 'great game' and the C.IA

By Richard M Bennett

Given the historical context of the unrest in Tibet, there is reason to believe Beijing was caught on the hop with the recent demonstrations for the simple reason that their planning took place outside of Tibet and that the direction of the protesters is similarly in the hands of anti-Chinese organizers safely out of reach in Nepal and northern India.

从西藏骚乱的来龙去脉来看，北京被最近的示威活动逼得手忙脚乱，有理由相信原因是策划示威活动是在西藏g之外，并且抗议的指挥是在尼泊尔和印度北部反中国组织的掌握中。

Similarly, the funding and overall control of the unrest has also been linked to Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama, and by inference to the US Central Intelligence Agency (C,IA) because of his close cooperation with US intelligence for over 50 years.

同样，由于藏人的精神领袖 dalai喇嘛和美国情报部门50多年来的密切合作，

有线索（表明）这次骚乱是在美国中央情报局的涉及下，由 dalai喇嘛资助和掌控的。

Indeed, with the C.IA's deep involvement with the Free Tibet Movement and its funding of the suspiciously well-informed Radio Free Asia, it would seem somewhat unlikely that any revolt could

have been planned or occurred without the prior knowledge, and even perhaps the agreement, of the National Clandestine Service (formerly known as the Directorate of Operations) at C.IA headquarters in Langley.

中情局密切参与自由xizang运动，而且此机构资助的自由亚洲电台神奇地知道详细的内情，因此任何骚乱看起来都实在不象是在中情局事先不知情的情况下策划和实施的，甚至（骚乱）有可能是得到了坐落在郎格雷城(Langley)的中情局总部国家秘密服务处（前称是行动委员会）的批准。

Respected columnist and former senior Indian Intelligence officer, B Raman, commented on March 21 that "on the basis of available evidence, it was possible to assess with a reasonable measure of conviction" that the initial uprising in Lhasa on March 14 "had been pre-planned and well orchestrated".

著名的专栏作家，前印度高级情报官员B. 喇曼（Raman）在3月21日评论说，根据目前各种迹象，已经可以合理的推测，3月14日的起义的开始，是有预谋、有指挥的。

Could there be a factual basis to the suggestion that the main benefiC.IAries to the death and destruction sweeping Tibet are in Washington? History would suggest that this is a distinct possibility.

那么猜测席卷西藏的伤亡和破坏的受益人在（美国）华盛顿有没有事实根据？历史启发说，这有明显的可能。

The C.IA conducted a large scale covert action campaign against the communist Chinese in Tibet starting in 1956. This led to a disastrous bloody uprising in 1959, leaving tens of thousands of Tibetans dead, while the Dalai Lama and about 100,000 followers were forced to flee across the treacherous Himalayan passes to India and Nepal.

为对抗中共在1956年开始进入西藏，中情局指挥了一个大规模的策反行动。这次行动导致了1959年灾难性的血腥起义，造成了数万藏人丧生。 dalai喇嘛带着10万部下被迫穿越喜马拉雅山的陡峭关口，逃到印度和尼泊尔。

The C.IA established a secret military training camp for the Dalai Lama's resistance fighters at Camp Hale near Leadville, Colorado, in the US. The Tibetan guerrillas were trained and equipped by the C.IA for guerrilla warfare and sabotage operations against the communist Chinese.

中情局在美国科罗拉多州(Colorado)里德维里（Leadville）附近的海尔营地

为 dalai喇嘛的抵抗战士建立了一个训练营地。藏族游击队经受中情局游击战和破坏行动的训练，来对抗中共，

The US-trained guerrillas regularly carried out raids into Tibet, on occasions led by C.IA-contract mercenaries and supported by C.IA planes. The initial training program ended in December 1961, though the camp in Colorado appears to have remained open until at least 1966.

在美国训练的游击队在有中情局雇员领导和支持的情况下，每隔一段时期就进入藏区进行袭击。最初的集训在1961年12月结束。

The C.IA Tibetan Task Force created by Roger E McCarthy, alongside the Tibetan guerrilla army, continued the operation codenamed ST CIRCUS to harass the Chinese occupation forces for another 15 years until 1974, when offiC.IAlly sanctioned involvement ceased.

罗格E麦克卡提（Roger E McCarthy）创建了中情局的西藏差遣队，协助藏族游击队，进行代号为ST马戏的活动，来骚扰中国人xizang驻军。活动持续了15年，一直到1974年，官方的停止批准（这一活动）

McCarthy, who also served as head of the Tibet Task Force at the height of its activities from 1959 until 1961, later went on to run similar operations in Vietnam and Laos.

从1959年到1961年xizang差遣队的行动高潮中，麦克卡提还担任负责人，其后遣入越南和老挝从事相似的活动

By the mid-1960s, the C.IA had switched its strategy from parachuting guerrilla fighters and intelligence agents into Tibet to establishing the Chusi Gangdruk, a guerrilla army of some 2,000 ethnic Khamba fighters at bases such as Mustang in Nepal.

在60年代中期，中情局变换了战术，不再用降落伞投放游击战士和间谍，而是以尼泊尔的木寺塘（Mustang）为基地，建立了一只有大约2000卡巴族（Khamba）战士组成的陆军游击队。

This base was only closed down in 1974 by the Nepalese government after being put under tremendous pressure by Beijing.

After the Indo-China War of 1962, the C.IA developed a close relationship with the Indian intelligence services in both training and supplying agents in Tibet.

尼泊尔政府在北京的强大压力下，于1974年关闭了这个基地。在1962年印中战争爆发后，中情局在xizang训练和提供间谍方面，和印度情报局发展了密切的关系。

Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison in their book The C.IA's Secret War in Tibet disclose that the C.IA and the Indian intelligence services cooperated in the training and equipping of Tibetan agents and speC.IAl forces troops and in forming joint aerial and intelligence units such as the Aviation Research Center and SpeC.IAl Center.

肯尼-康贝（Kenneth Conboy ）和詹姆斯-茉莉森（James Morrison）合著了一本书《中情局在xizang秘密战争》，书中透露中情局和印度情报局合作训练和武装藏人间谍，并且一起建立了空中侦察机构，比如航空研究中心和特种兵中心等等。

This collaboration continued well into the 1970s and some of the programs that it sponsored, espeC.IAlly the speC.IAl forces unit of Tibetan refugees which would become an important part of the Indian SpeC.IAl Frontier Force, continue into the present.

这种合作顺利地持续到70年代，其资助的项目，特别是藏人难民特种部队一直持续到现在，并成为印度前线特种武装的重要成分。

Only the deterioration in relations with India which coincided with improvements in those with Beijing brought most of the joint C.IA-Indian operations to an end.

随着印度和北京关系改善，中情局和印度关系才开始淡漠，导致中情局和印度大多数配合行动结束。

Though Washington had been scaling back support for the Tibetan guerrillas since 1968, it is thought that the end of offiC.IAl US backing for the resistance only came during meetings between president Richard Nixon and the Chinese communist leadership in Beijing in February 1972.

随着华盛顿自从1968年一直在减少对藏族游击队的支持规模，一般认为，美国对抵抗行动的支持，是在1972年2月尼克松总统会见中共领导人期间结束的

Victor Marchetti, a former C.IA officer has described the outrage many field agents felt when Washington finally pulled the plug, adding that a number even "[turned] for solace to the Tibetan prayers which they had learned during their years with the Dalai Lama".

前中情局官员维克多-马彻其（Victor Marchetti）描述了很多前线特务在华盛顿最终撤除行动时候的愤慨情景，还说有数人甚至为了得到安慰，竟去做xizang式的祷告，这些藏式祷告是他们在和 dalai喇嘛相处的岁月中学会的。

The former C.IA Tibetan Task Force chief from 1958 to 1965, John Kenneth Knaus, has been quoted as saying, "This was not some C.IA black-bag operation." He added, "The initiative was coming from ... the entire US government."

约翰-肯尼-瑙斯（ohn Kenneth Knaus）在1958-1965年期间担任前xizang差遣队的队长，用他的话来说：“这又不是中情局自己暗中搞鬼”并且说“率先开始的是整个美国政府”

In his book Orphans of the Cold War, Knaus writes of the obligation Americans feel toward the cause of Tibetan independence from China. Significantly, he adds that its realization "would validate the more worthy motives of we who tried to help them achieve this goal over 40 years ago. It would also alleviate the guilt some of us feel over our participation in these efforts, which cost others their lives, but which were the prime adventure of our own."

在瑙斯所著《冷战孤儿》一书中，他描述了美国人对xizang从中国独立出去的目标持有的责任感。值得注意的是，他还说“我们尝试帮他们达到（独立）目的已经40年多年了，实现了才会让我们更有价值的愿望具有可行性，我们付出巨大努力，出生入死，还有别人献出生命，让我们当中有人感到内疚，（只有实现独立）才会得到籍慰。”

Despite the lack of offiC.IAl support it is still widely rumored that the C.IA were involved, if only by proxy, in another failed revolt in October 1987, the unrest that followed and the consequent Chinese repression continuing till May 1993.

尽管中情局没有公开的支援，到处都有谣言说他们用代理人参与1987年10月失败的叛乱。这次动荡随之而来的结果，是中国人的镇压一直持续到1993年。

The timing for another serious attempt to destabilize Chinese rule in Tibet would appear to be right for the C.IA and Langley will undoubtedly keep all its options open.

择机在下一次重大行动中动摇中国统治的，符合中情局的想法，毫无疑问，郎格雷城总部不会排除任何手段。

China is faced with significant problems, with the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang province; the activities of the Gong among many other dissident groups and of course growing concern over the security of the Summer Olympic Games in August.

中国面临着各种明显的问题，有新疆的穆斯林，有功的活动，还有其他反对派。更跑不了对8月份夏季奥运会安全问题的焦虑。

China is viewed by Washington as a major threat, both economic and military, not just in Asia, but in Africa and Latin America as well.

在经济和军事上，中国都被华盛顿看成是巨大的威胁，威胁不仅仅在亚洲，而且延续到非洲和拉丁美洲。

The C.IA also views China as being "unhelpful" in the "war on terror", with little or no cooperation being offered and nothing positive being done to stop the flow of arms and men from Muslim areas of western China to support Islamic extremist movements in Afghanistan and Central Asian states.

中情局认为中国在“反恐战争”中没有用，基本上不提供合作，中国西部的穆斯林地区武器和人员涌入阿富汗和中亚诸国支持伊斯兰极端运动，（中国）也没有做什么有益的事情去阻止

To many in Washington, this may seem the ideal opportunity to knock the Beijing government off balance as Tibet is still seen as China's potential weak spot.

对华盛顿很多人来说，这似乎是一个极好的机会，让北京政府顾此失彼，因为xizang看来是中国的软肋。

The C.IA will undoubtedly ensure that its fingerprints are not discovered all over this growing revolt. Cut-outs and proxies will be used among the Tibetan exiles in Nepal and India's northern border areas.

在这场愈演愈烈的叛乱中，毫无疑问，中情局会确保不留下自己的指纹，对尼泊尔和印度北部的流亡藏人将会使用代理人和单线联系

Indeed, the C.IA can expect a significant level of support from a number of security organizations in both India and Nepal and will have no trouble in providing the resistance movement with advice, money and above all, publicity.

中情局实在是期待尼泊尔、印度的治安机构都高度支持，并且给抵抗运动提供指导、资金，还有最重要的，就是宣传。

However, not until the unrest shows any genuine signs of becoming an open revolt by the great mass of ethnic Tibetans against the Han Chinese and Hui Muslims will any weapons be allowed to appear.

然而，直到动荡之前，一直没有可靠的迹象表明这会变成一个有大规模藏族公开的对着汉族和回族暴乱，而且也没有迹象表明武器会出现。

Large quantities of former Eastern bloc small arms and explosives have been reportedly smuggled into Tibet over the past 30 years, but these are likely to remain safely hidden until the right opportunity presents itself.

有报道说，在过去30年中，大量前东欧阵营的小型武器和炸药被偷运到xizang。但这些武器好象仍被隐藏起来，直到时机成熟才会冒出来。

The weapons have been acquired on the world markets or from stocks captured by US or Israeli forces. They have been sanitized and are deniable, untraceable back to the C.IA.

这些武器是从被美国和以色列从世界各地市场或者仓库中截获而来的，几经转手，变得来路不明，不能沿着线索追到中情局。

Weapons of this nature also have the advantage of being interchangeable with those used by the Chinese armed forces and of course use the same ammunition, easing the problem of resupply during any future conflict.

这类武器还有一个好处，就是可以和中国武装力量的武器兼容，自然弹药也是相同的的，在未来的冲突中，解决了（消耗后）补给的问题

Though offiC.IAl support for the Tibetan resistance ended 30 years ago, the C.IA has kept open its lines of communications and still funds much of the Tibetan Freedom movement.

尽管中情局30年前就结束了对xizang抵抗运动公开支援，但一直保持联络，并仍在为大量xizang自由运动中提供资助

So is the C.IA once again playing the "great game" in Tibet?

这样看来，中情局是否又一次在去参加“xizang大赛”呢？

It certainly has the capability, with a significant intelligence and paramilitary presence in the region. Major bases exist in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and several Central Asian states.

以他们在令人注目的情报机构和军事辅助的存在，他们肯定有这个能力。在阿富汗、伊拉克、巴基斯坦和几个中亚国家都有重要根据地。

It cannot be doubted that it has an interest in undermining China, as well as the more obvious target of Iran.

毫无疑问，象对更显著破坏目标伊朗一样，他们也有兴致破坏中国。

So the probable answer is yes, and indeed it would be rather surprising if the C.IA was not taking more than just a passing interest in Tibet. That is after all what it is paid to do.

所以可能的答案是，对，如果中情局在xizang放弃机会不参与，那实在是太怪了。这是一直花钱要做的事情。

Since September 11, 2001, there has been a sea-change in US Intelligence attitudes, requirements and capabilities. Old operational plans have been dusted off and updated. Previous assets re-activated. Tibet and the perceived weakness of China's position there will probably have been fully reassessed.

自从2001年9月10日以来，美国情报机构在态度、需求、设备上发生了翻天覆地的变化。废弃的旧计划被捡出来更新了。原有的内线再现活力。xizang和在中国发现的各薄弱环节（的渠道）完全打通了。

For Washington and the C.IA, this may seem a heaven-sent opportunity to create a significant lever against Beijing, with little risk to American interests; simply a win-win situation.

对华盛顿和中情局来说，这是天赐良机（让他们）创立反华势力重要的操纵杆，而伤害美国利益的风险却极小，根本就是有赚无赔的买卖。

The Chinese government would be on the receiving end of worldwide condemnation for its continuing repression and violation of human rights and it will be young Tibetans dying on the streets of Lhasa rather than yet more uniformed American kids.

中国政府会因继续镇压、侵犯人权，受到世界范围的谴责，而将来在街上丧生的是藏族青年，而不是身穿制服的美国孩子。

he consequences of any open revolt against Beijing, however, are that once again the fear of arrest, torture and even execution will pervade every corner of both Tibet and those neighboring provinces where large Tibetan populations exist, such as Gansu, Qinghai and Sichuan.

然而叛乱的结果是逮捕、酷刑甚至枪决，在xizang和大量藏族聚居的邻居省份，如甘肃、青海四川，这恐惧将会再次遍布每个角落

And the Tibetan Freedom movement still has little likelihood of achieving any significant improvement in central Chinese policy in the long run and no chance whatever of removing its control of Lhasa and their homeland.

在中国中央政策远景中，xizang自由运动要获得重大进展几乎没有什么可能。也没有什么机会从他们的家乡摆脱中央的控制。

Once again it would appear that the Tibetan people will find themselves trapped between an oppressive Beijing and a manipulative Washington.

看起来藏人又会发现他们被北京的镇压和华盛顿的操纵套在中间。

Beijing sends in the heavies

北京派遣重兵

The fear that the United States, Britain and other Western states may try to portray Tibet as another Kosovo may be part of the reason why the Chinese authorities reacted as if faced with a genuine mass revolt rather than their offiC.IAl portrayal of a short-lived outbreak of unrest by malcontents supporting the Dalai Lama.

北京政权官方描述这次是是支持 dalai的反对派短暂爆发的动荡，可是反应却象是面对了真正巨大规模的叛乱，担心美国、应该和其他西方国家会把xizang描绘成另一个科索沃，可能是部分原因。

Indeed, so seriously did Beijing view the situation that a speC.IAl security coordination unit, the 110 Command Center, has been established in Lhasa with the primary objective of suppressing the disturbances and restoring full central government control.

北京实在是紧张地关注局势，在拉萨建立了110指挥中心这个特种部队协调单位，最大的目标就是镇压骚乱，全面恢复中央政府的控制

The center appears to be under the direct control of Zhang Qingli, first secretary of the Tibet Party and a President Hu Jintao loyalist. Zhang is also the former Xinjiang deputy party secretary with considerable experience in counter-terrorism operations in that region.

这个中心看起来受xizang党委第一书记张庆黎的直接控制，他是胡锦涛主席的亲信。张庆黎还是前新疆党委代理书记，在当地对抗恐怖活动方面很有经验。。

Others holding important positions in Lhasa are Zhang Xinfeng, vice minister of the Central Public Security Ministry and Zhen Yi, deputy commander of the People's Armed Police Headquarters in Beijing.

其他重要官员还有中央安全部副部长张新风、人民武警北京总部的代理总司令郑毅。

The seriousness with which Beijing is treating the present unrest is further illustrated by the deployment of a large number of important army units from the Chengdu Military Region, including brigades from the 149th Mechanized Infantry Division, which acts as the region's rapid reaction force.

北京对付当前动乱的紧张程度，还显示在从成都军区派遣大量的精锐陆军，包括调用149机械步兵师的一个旅，作快速反应武装

According to a United Press International report, elite ground force units of the People's Liberation Army were involved in Lhasa, and the new T-90 armored personnel carrier and T-92 wheeled armored vehicles were deployed. According to the report, China has denied the participation of the army in the crackdown, saying it was carried out by units of the armed police. "Such equipment as mentioned above has never been deployed by China's armed police, however."

根据合众社报道，人民解放军精锐地面部队在拉萨参战，并且派遣新的T-90装甲运兵车和T-92装甲车。中国否认陆军参与了镇压。说镇压是武警部队干的。“然而武警部队却从来没有派遣上述武装设备”

Air support is provided by the 2nd Army Aviation Regiment, based at Fenghuangshan, Chengdu, in Sichuan province. It operates a mix of helicopters and STOL transports from a frontline base near Lhasa. Combat air support could be quickly made available from fighter ground attack squadrons based within the Chengdu region.

The Xizang Military District forms the Tibet garrison, which has two mountain infantry units; the 52nd Brigade based at Linzhi and the 53rd Brigade at Yaoxian Shannxi. These are supported by the 8th Motorized Infantry Division and an artillery brigade at Shawan, Xinjiang.

坐落在成都凤凰山的第二空军团提供了空军支援。军团混和操作了直升飞机和短跑道运输机。以四川地区为基地的空对地攻击飞行大队，也可以迅速用空中作战提供支援。

Tibet is also no longer quite as remote or difficult to resupply for the Chinese army. The construction of the first railway between 2001 and 2007 has significantly eased the problems of the movement of large numbers of troops and equipment from Qinghai onto the rugged Tibetan plateau.

对中国军队来说，xizang已完全不会鞭长莫及或者有补给困难。在2001到2007年之间，从青海到崎岖的青藏高原所建第一条铁路，已经显著地解决了运送大规模军队和装备的困难。

Other precautions against a resumption of the long-term Tibetan revolts of previous years has led to a considerable degree of self-sufficiency in logistics and vehicle repair by the Tibetan garrison and an increasing number of small airfields have been built to allow rapid-reaction units to gain access to even the most remote areas.

在过去的岁月中，为预防长期的藏族叛乱，xizang卫戍区在后勤、车辆维修方面达到自给自足的程度已经相当可观，并且增建了小型机场，以便于快速反应部队到达哪怕是最遥远的地区。

The Chinese Security Ministry and intelligence services had been thought to have a suffocating presence in the province and indeed the ability to detect any serious protest movement and suppress resistance.

一般认为，中国安全部和情报部门在这个省份部署得密密麻麻，有实力侦探到任何重大的抗争运动，并且把抵抗镇压下去。

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